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THE ARBITRATOR,  THE  COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENT  AND  THE  LAW
By PAUL C. WEILER*
Two recent  decisions in the  Ontario High  Court, quashing  labour  arbi-
tration  awards,  have  demonstrated  the  need  for  a thorough  canvass  of the
complexities  of a new and important issue in labour arbitration. Very generally
stated,  the problem is whether,  and to what  extent, an  arbitration  board,  in
adjudicating a grievance under the collective agreement, may utilize statutes in
reaching its decision.'  To the layman this might not appear to be a very difficult
problem. He would naturally  assume that laws  enacted by the representative
and  sovereign legislature  would be binding  on all citizens  of the  jurisdiction,
including arbitrators. To the lawyer, though, the issues are much more trouble-
some, because the legal mind is much more concerned with proper procedures
and limited jurisdictions.  Almost invariably a collective agreement  defines  an
arbitrator's  jurisdiction  in terms  of the interpretation  and  application  of the
provisions  of  the  agreement.  Most  then  include  a  prohibition  against  the
arbitrator  adding to  or  amending  any of  the  terms  of  this  agreement.  Since
utilization of statutory materials appears inconsistent with these typical arbitra-
tion clauses, and since the contract is the source of the arbitrator's authority to
decide the dispute in the first place, the lawyer's concern is understandable.
Before I canvass the dimensions of the problem in detail, I will take a brief
look  at the  judicial  response.  In International Chemical Workers Union v.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1Though I have not  found  previous  discussions  of this  issue  in the  literature  of
Canadian labour law, there are several good contributions in recent American publications.
I have relied  especially  on  the publication  of meetings  of the National  Association  of
Arbitrators. See  Meltzer,  "Ruminations  about  Ideology, Law,  and Labour Arbitration",
from The Arbitrator,  the N.L.R.B., and the Courts, (1967 - 20th Annual Meeting) 1, at
14-19;  with  comments  at 27-36;  Mittenthal,  "The  Role  of Law  in  Arbitration",  with
rejoinders from Meltzer,  Howlett  and St. Antoine, from Developments in American and
Foreign Arbitration (1968  - 21st Annual  Meeting)  at 42;  and  Sovern,  "When  Should
Arbitrators  Follow Federal Law", from Arbitrators  and the Expanding Role of Neutrals
(1970 - 23rd Annual Meeting) 29. Recent  discussions of special areas of statute law and
arbitration  include Gould,  Labour Arbitration of  Grievances Involving Racial Discrimi-
nation (1969),  24 Arbitration Journal  197; McKelvey, Sex and the Single Arbitrator  (1970-
71),  24 Industrial  and Labour Relations  Review  335. I will  indicate the positions  taken
by these various writers later on, where appropriate to the text.OSGOODE  HALL  LAW  JOURNAL
Krever et al,2 a grievance had been brought by the Union  against Consumers'
Gas for having  a supervisor  do work normally performed  by bargaining  unit
employees,  in  breach  of an  explicit  term  of the  agreement.  The  arbitrator,
however,  denied the grievance  on the grounds  that the supervisor in question
was the only person who was qualified to perform this work, under safety regu-
lations issued by the Atomic Energy Control Act. The Court quashed the award
on the ground that the decision was in conflict with the terms of the agreement,
and the Board was not justified in using the regulations to justify such an altera-
tion of these terms. Mr. Justice Stark does say that "the Board is strictly limited
to interpreting  the written contract",  and thus  seems  to speak  directly to  our
problem. However, it is  also apparent that his conclusion in the circumstances
of this case was  affected by the fact the Company had deliberately placed itself
in the position of having to choose between the agreement and the legislation,
when it promoted the supervisor out of the bargaining unit.
No such restrictive interpretation can be placed on the decision in a more
recent case. In R.C.A. Victor Ltd. v. I.W.A., 3 the collective agreement provided
for limited major medical insurance at the expense of the Company. However,
this insurance agreement was rendered null and void by Section 25 of the Health
Services Insurance Act of 1969, which provided for compulsory medical insur-
ance  through O.H.S.I.P. Section  10(2)  of the Act provided that:
Nothing in  this Act shall be construed to affect any agreement or arrangement for
contribution by an employer of all or any of the premiums payable for insurance in
respect of his employees and any obligation of the employer thereunder to pay all or
any  part of  the premium  for insured  health  services  continues  in  respect  of  the
payment of the premium for insured health  services under this Act.
The Union  lodged a grievance  which  claimed that the  Company  should pay
for all the premiums of O.H.S.I.P., the latter being a more comprehensive  and
more  expensive  scheme.  A  difficult  question  of statutory  interpretation  was
raised in the case but the arbitrator concluded this issue in the Union's favour
and upheld  the grievance.4 Mr. Justice Grant in the High  Court quashed the
2 (1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14,086 (Ont. H.C.).
3 (1971),  71 C.L.L.C. 14,099 (Ont. H.C.).
41 was also  faced with  the same problem as arbitrator  of  a different  agreement  of
R.C.A.  Victor with another union at a different plant, though with the same language. My
decision  followed the arbitration award in the case referred to in the text but preceded the
quashing of that award. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, I held that I had jurisdiction
as an  arbitrator  to consider what I took to be a statutory  amendment of a term of the
collective  agreement  in  the  course  of  interpreting  and  applying  the  agreement  itself.
However,  I  interpreted  the  statutory  amendment  in  accordance  with  the  Company
argument,  and the conclusion of Mr. Justice Stark. The jurisdictional  issue is complicated
by  the  fact that  Section  10(3),  which  created a  new  union  right to  the  excess  of  any
premiums following the changeover to  OHSIP, specifically provided for arbitration under
Section  10(3) and inferentially excluded it under Section 10(2). This view of statutory inter-
pretation does not seem to me to do justice to the reasonable expectations of the legislature.
The obligation to pay premiums for the old private scheme was enforceable in arbitration.
The legislature has provided  for the use of arbitration  to enforce  the new obligation  in
respect of the excess  of premiums under OHSIP. What possible reason  could it have for
excluding  the use  of arbitration  to  enforce  the  continued  basic  obligation  to  pay  the
premiums for the new insurance  scheme of OHSIP? In interpreting statutes  or collective
agreements, I have always found it a very helpful step in assessing the contentions of either
side  to  ask the  simple question - "Now why would  the legislature  (or the parties) have
wanted that result?" If this question were asked in the R.C.A. Victor situation, the conclu-
sion as to  the jurisdictional issue  is, with all due respect, obvious.
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award on two grounds, one relating to the interpretation of the statute but the
first, and more important for our purposes, being that the arbitration board had
no power to base its decision  on the statute rather  than the  agreement.  Key
passages in his opinion which indicate the gist of his reasoning read as follows:5
All  subsections  of  section  10  do  impose  obligations  on  the  employer,  who  has
contracted with employees to provide them with some form of health insurance. The
section  deals with the extent of such continued obligation during the balance of the
term  of  the  agreement  or  until  a  new  agreement  in  respect  thereof  has  been
negotiated between the parties. In our present case,  the rights and obligations of the
parties,  however,  in  that interval  arise  by  virtue of the statute  rather than  by the
agreement  It would  be otherwise if the parties by their  agreement had specifically
contracted as to their respective  rights and obligations when OHSIP should become
effective.
A board of arbitration  derives  its authority  from and is limited by the terms of the
collective  agreement.  Its  jurisdiction  is  solely  to determine  questions  arising  with
respect  to  the  application,  administration  or  alleged  violation  of  the  collective
agreement.  The  board  was  limited  in  its  consideration  of  this  grievance  to  the
question  as to whether or  not the  collective  agreement,  as  opposed  to  the statute,
imposed  an obligation on the part of the company  to pay all  the additional OHSIP
premiums when the same should come into effect on October  1st,  1969.
The majority  award is therefore  beyond the jurisdiction of the board by reason  of
the fact it has based its decision on an interpretation of the statute rather than on the
collective agreement.
These are the two judicial decisions reported in recent Canadian law which
focus  directly  on this problem.  (Of  course,  there  is  a great  deal  of general
language in other decisions  about the limited contractual  character of an arbi-
trator's jurisdiction. However, the cases either do not deal with a statutory basis
for the  alleged  "amendment"  of the agreement 6  or,  if they do,  the  statute is
interpreted as inapplicable in any event.7) As far as the two relevant cases  are
concerned,  whatever  may be  said  about  the  rightness  or  wrongness  of  the
particular  decisions,  the  reasoning  in  each  displays  the  deficiency  which  is
endemic across  the whole  spectrum of judicial review  of administrative  deci-
5 Id. at 14,524-25.
6 In Port Arthur Shipbuilding v. Arthurs, [1969]  S.C.R.  85  at 95-96,  the Supreme
Court of Canada said:
An  arbitration board  of the type  under consideration  has no inherent  powers  of
review  similar to those of the Courts. Its only powers  are those conferred upon it
by the collective  agreement and these are usually defined in more detail. It  has no
inherent  powers to amend,  modify, or ignore the collective  agreement. But this  is
exactly what this board did in this case and it was clearly in error in so doing, and
its award should be quashed.
Though this passage was relied on by the court in R.C.A. Victor Ltd., it dealt with
the power of an arbitrator to "imply" additional remedial powers as part of a common law
of labour arbitration, not with his right (or duty) to apply mandatory statutory provisions
in administering the agreement.
7 Two  other recent  Supreme Court of Canada decisions,  Union Carbide v.  Weiler
(1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 333 and General Truck Drivers Union Local 938 v. Hoar  Transport
(1969),  4 D.L.R. (3d) 449, dealt with a situation where an arbitrator  (this writer) utilized a
statute as the basis for giving relief to the application of procedural  penalty clauses  in the
agreement.  The  decision of  the Court, as I  read it, is based  on  the  conclusion that  the
statute did not apply, and is not authority  against using statutes if they are interpreted  as
applying.
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sions.8 The nature of this deficiency is nicely captured by the phrase "absentee
management". The courts see only a very few of the "trouble cases" which may
appear  among  the many  decided by those  with primary  responsibility in the
area (and any one judge is involved in only a fraction of those which do get to
court).  As a result, the judge is directly confronted with only an isolated slice of
what is usually a complicated legal situation. Moreover, the limitations  of the
adversary  process  do  not permit  ready  education  of  the judges in the many
facets  of the legal  area  as  a whole.  Even  if the  administrative  decisions  are
reported  (as are the labour arbitration cases, for instance), it is almost unheard
for judges to read or utilize them directly.
Yet the courts "hold the trumps" because of their superior position in the
hierarchy  of legal authority.  They can insert new,  abstract,  and  authoritative
legal doctrines into the on-going process of administrative decisions, which can
wreak great damage to the coherence of this order, especially when read literally
and out of context. Despite these evident dangers,  the belief in the desirability
of judicial review remains  dominant in our legal  ideology and its incidence is
rapidly increasing in labour arbitration. I believe the only way to preserve the
virtues  and  minimize  the  harms from judicial  supervision  of  specialized  tri-
bunals  is  to  initiate  scholarly  discussion  of  problem  areas  in  substantive
administrative  law and policy, as they are seen from inside the process.  These
must canvass  all the issues  in  the  area,  showing  both  the  relationships  and
differences between them, and articulating the reasons why the law should lean
one way rather  than  another. If these  are used  both by lawyers  and  by the
courts, it will be possible to develop a more informed, and perhaps more sympa-
thetic, exercise of judicial review. It is to this end that this comment is directed.
There are several different contractual  situations in which a statutory rule
may be relevant. The first occurs where there is very general or vague language
in a contractual provision and the statute is sought to be used as an aid in inter-
pretation of the agreement. For example, the agreement may speak in general
terms of rights accruing to an "employee".  Can an arbitrator look to the Labour
Relations Act for help in defining the status of a person on a legal strike, for
example?9 An agreement provides that there is to be no discipline without "just
cause". Can an arbitrator, faced with discipline for insubordination in refusing
to obey a work order, look to a statute  (e.g.,  the Atomic Energy Control  Act)
8  1 have  analyzed this  defect  in judicial  review  in greater  detail  in a recent  article
about the Supreme  Court of Canada and labour law. See Weiler,  The 'Slippery Slope' of
Judicial Intervention (1971),  9  Osgoode Hall Law Journal  1.
9 In Falconbridge  Nickel Mines (1971)  unreported (Weiler), I utilized the Section 1(2)
definition in the Labour  Relations Act of the status of an employee  on strike  as an aid in
interpreting the significance  of time on strike in calculating the  service which determined
the length  of vacation  to  which  an  employee  was  entitled  under  the  agreement.  This
decision  was  recently upheld  on a certiorari motion in the High Court. The arbitrator in
Canada Bread Co. (1970),  22 L.A.C. 98 (Christie), used various provisions in the Labour
Relations Act in defining  the ambit of the "collective  agreement"  which  he was to apply.
Similarly, the problem of determining length  of seniority where corporate  ownership of a
plant changes but the agreement is continued would be helped by a consideration of Section
7  of the Employment Standards Act, which provides for continuity of employment upon
transfer of a business (a factor which was missed in the decision in Reinforcing Steel (1970)
unreported (Weiler)). I would add at this point that the arbitration cases which I am going
to cite  are primarily my own,  because I am using them mainly  as illustrative of different
problem-situations. I have not systematically  canvassed all the arbitration  decisions  to try
to establish  any arbitral  concensus  as to the issues.
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in determining whether the work ordered was unsafe? 1 0 An agreement provides
for seniority rights to jobs where there is sufficient "ability".  Can an arbitrator
look to statutes prohibiting discrimination against women to hold that general
company rules against women holding some jobs are invalid?"
The  very  general  and  sweeping  language  of  Mr.  Justice  Grant,  while
admittedly  directed  to another problem,  does  appear  to throw  doubt on the
legitimacy of the reference to statutes in any of these situations, and I have had
counsel argue against their use on such a basis. However, I think there can be
no doubt that such a source for arbitral reasoning both should be, and will be,
held legitimate.  The arbitrator is enforcing an obligation imposed by the agree-
ment, and is only using the statute as an aid in discovering or crystallizing the
meaning of the agreement. The language of the agreement on its face does not
give the  answer  and  arbitration  boards  may  and  do  use their  own  common
sense,  other arbitration precedents,  or common law decisions  to elaborate  the
meaning of the contract. Surely,  the policies  and standards  developed by the
legislature should be of even more significant weight in this process. The parties
should be assumed to want their agreement interpreted, if possible, in line with
contemporary  law  (even  if  this  requires  over-riding  earlier  common  law  or
arbitral presumptions' 2).
10 For example, would the decision  in  the Krever case, supra,  note 2,  have been  the
same if a bargaining  unit employee  had been ordered to  do the work,  declined to do  so
because he believed it unsafe without qualifications or experience,  and been  suspended for
insubordination.  In  determining  whether  this  discipline  was  for "just  cause",  could  an
arbitrator look at the statutory safety regulations? In a recent case, Int'l Woodworkers of
America Local 1-71 v. Weldwood (1970),  74 W.W.R.  568 (B.C.C.A.), the Court of Appeal
looked at a safety provision in  a statute to find the employees'  conduct to be unsafe  and
negligent,  and thus open to discipline.  On  the other hand,  the propriety  of an  arbitrator
looking at a statute for this purpose was seriously doubted in Re Pulp, Sulphite and Paper
Mill Workers and Domtar Pulp and Paper  (1966),  16 L.A.C. 408 (Lane),  and apparently,
in Ontario Steel Products (1972),  23 L.A.C. 386  (Hinnegan). 11 In Re ICW Local 186 and Continental Can (1970),  21  L.A.C.  361  (Palmer),  the
arbitrator referred, though in a subsidiary way, to the legislative policy of the province to
find such a company practice to be invalid under the general  language of the Agreement.
12 It  is in this latter situation that the use of statutory materials  is likely to be most
significant. Earlier arbitration  precedents  may have  established  presumptions  in  applying
general language in the agreement, and the latter statute may make this presumption illegal.
Resort to the statute may be the necessary basis for the legal justification of ignoring a series
of precedents which constituted a consensus among  arbitrators. For example, many earlier
decisions had held overtime to be compulsory  in the absence of contrary language in the
Agreement. Sections  14  and  18  of the Employment Standards  Act make overtime  illegal
after  8 hours in the day and 48 hours in the week. These sections were relied on in Lake
Ontario Steel  (1968)  unreported  (Johnston)  and Lake  Ontario Steel  (1968)  unreported
(Weiler),  to hold that employees  could not be compelled to work overtime,  or disciplined
for refusal,  in breach  of the  statute (and where  one  of  the exempting provisions  in the
statute did not apply). Neither of these cases  involved an agreement with explicit language
making all overtime compulsory  (as was held to be the case in Re Int'l Union of Electrical
Workers, Local 566 and J.A. Wilson Display (1968),  19 L.A.C. 352 (Johnston)),  and in Gall
Metals (1971), 3 L.A.C. 33 (Egan). Since writing this piece, I have reviewed  the relation of
the Employment Standards Act as to overtime under the collective agreement in the as yet
unreported decision in Grace  Cryovac (1972; Weiler). A similar problem would be faced in
cases of discipline for garnishee orders which was apparently justified under earlier arbitra-
tion decisions (the cases  are reviewed  in Re Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union Local
2537 and K.V.P.  Co. Ltd. (1965),  16  L.A.C.  73  (Robinson)),  but is  now  illegal  under
Section  5  of  the Employment Standards  Act:  "No employer shall  dismiss  or suspend  an
employee upon the ground that garnishment proceedings are or may be taken against that
employee."
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I have referred to, though not discussed in detail, the problem of the use of
statutes as an aid in interpreting the collective agreement, even though I do not
believe there  is much  doubt about  its legitimacy and  the two  decisions  men-
tioned earlier do not focus on its legality. However, it is vital that we distinguish
these cases from those that do raise real issues about the limits of an arbitrator's
jurisdiction in order that our answer  to the latter not unwittingly produce  an
undesirable rule for the former. The difficult cases, where there is a real conflict
of important  interests, occur where the  statutory rule  is inconsistent with the
provision of  the collective agreement,  or any fair interpretation  of the latter.
This becomes  a problem when the statute mandatorily limits and over-rides the
exercise of a contractual  freedom,  and is not just a supplementary  aid in the
interpretation of the open or "unwritten"  area of the agreement. Is it legitimate
for an arbitrator to take account of this legislative purpose in the performance
of his task of administering the collective agreement?
A further basic distinction must be made even within this category. Some-
times, the objectives of the statute may be negative - the prohibition of certain
kinds  of contractual  terms - and the  arbitrator  will  satisfy  them by simply
holding the offending contract term to be void for illegality. For example, the
contract may provide for compulsory overtime  in breach  of the Employment
Standards Act, or employer reimbursement of the last 10%  of doctor's bills in
breach of the O.H.S.I.P. Act, or sex as a criterion for promotion, or pregnancy
as an automatic reason for discharge.  If this clause is deemed null and void, it
is simply treated  as excised  from the collective  agreement and  the rights  and
duties of the parties in arbitration can be determined  by the application of the
other terms of the  agreement.  Refusal to  work overtime,  or being pregnant,
is evaluated under the "just cause" provision, seniority by reference to "ability"
in the individual case, and the employer is not obligated to pay any "insurance"
for  the remaining  10%  of unpaid medical  bills.13 This  procedure  is  legally
defensible,  I believe,  as  an  application of a contract  doctrine  of "illegality",
which  is  as  much  a part  of  the background  of  contract  law  as  the  "parole
evidence"  rule. It leaves  the arbitrator positively enforcing  only those obliga-
tions which actually flow from the contract.
The other, and much more difficult situation, occurs where the statute itself
is intended  to place a positive obligation  on one of the parties to the agree-
ment.14 The Employment  Standards  Act  may require  payment  of  minimum
13 A  recent  example  of  the  latter  situation  is Bendix-Eclipse  v.  U.A.W.  (1971),
71 C.L.L.C. 14,089 (Ont. H.C.), where the arbitrator interpreted the agreement as requiring
the employer to pay some of the extra doctor's fees  unpaid by O.H.S.I.P.,  and the court
quashed  the  award  as  requiring  private  medical  "insurance"  which  was  illegal  under
Section 25(1) of  The Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.O.  1970  c.  200. Presumably the
recent  decision  of  the  Arbitration  Board  in Board of Education of Etobicoke (1972)
unreported  (Vinnegan)  may receive the same treatment.
14There are some positive obligations  imposed on the parties, or directions given to
the arbitrator, under The Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.  1970 c. 232 which appear
to give him explicit powers to apply even in the face of contrary language in the agreement.
See Section 36(1)  dealing with the no-strike  clause, Section  37(1)  and (2) dealing with the
arbitration  clause,  Section  37(7a)  dealing with the equitable jurisdiction  of the arbitrator
in discipline  cases  and Section  70 dealing with  the statutory extension  of the agreement
during conciliation. Interesting  questions have been  and can be raised  about the compati-
bility of certain qualifications in the agreement and the scope of these mandatory terms  of
the agreement,  and  the  question  might arise  as  to the  arbitrator's power  to  follow  the
statute  in face  of the  agreement.  (See the  discussion in Royal Canadian  Mint (1972),  23
L.A.C, 365 (Abbott).
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wages,  or vacations,  or overtime  pay.15  The Health  Services  Insurance  Act
requires  substitution of O.H.S.I.P.  for P.S.I. and other private plans. It is not
enough simply to invalidate the offending wage, vacation pay, or health insur-
ance provisions in order to attain the statutory objectives because this will not
provide the employee with the positive benefits he is  supposed to receive.  Yet
the situation might appear to be qualitatively different in legal or jurisdictional
terms because the arbitrator is now positively implementing obligations  created
by statute and not by contract. I have no doubt that reviewing courts will find
this  a much more  difficult  arbitral innovation  to  swallow.  Still,  though,  the
dimensions  of the problem are basically the same - do we feel arbitrators  are
competent to interpret  statutes  and do we want them to use these  statutes to
rewrite part of a collective agreement,  the whole  of which has been negotiated
through compromises by each of the parties? Neither of these factors is altered
if we conceive of the statute, or the arbitrator's use of it, in essentially negative
or positive terms. 16  
*  *  . . *
What should be  the legal response  to this jurisdictional problem?  There
are plausible arguments which can be made for either side and I will begin by
making  the case  for arbitral jurisdiction  first. The labour relations  policy  in
Ontario, expressed both in the statute17 and in decisions of the Labour Relations
Board,'8  favours the channelling  of contractual  disputes  between parties  to a
collective  agreement  into grievance  arbitration. The parties  are both familiar
with and comfortable in this procedure. Prima facie, it makes sense to channel
disputes  about statutory  amendments  into  the  same  institution,  rather  than
utilizing  another  tribunal  or  the  courts.  The  arguments  of  cost,  speed,  and
informality  which justify  arbitration  generally  are  equally  applicable  here.19
In fact, they are even more significant in this context because the alternative is
almost certainly going to be duplication of litigation in different forums. If the
arbitrator cannot utilize the statute to hold a contractual provision illegal,  and
he applies the latter according to its terms, the result will be that the award will
have to be taken to court every time in order to consider the relevance and effect
of a statute.20 If an arbitrator cannot apply the statute positively, as a source of
15In Sargent Hardware (1971)  unreported  (Weiler),  I  was faced  with  a claim  by  a
female employee for equal pay for equal work under Part 6 of the Employment Standards
Act. The Union  argued that separate male and female seniority lists under the agreement
did not reflect differences in the work actually performed,  and thus differential rates of pay
were in breach  of this Part of the Act which prohibited such discrimination  based on sex.
In fact, the  seniority lists  did  reflect differences  in jobs  and  thus my  decision  was  that
the grievance was invalid and the real statutory claim was one relating to discrimination in
promotion. However, if I had found the factual basis of the Union claim to be established,
it would not have been enough, for the grievor's purposes,  to simply hold negatively that
the offending provisions were illegal and thus void. The grievor's claim required a positive
right under some term defining the wages to be paid and a very nice question would arise
as to whether they should be the lower female  or the higher male rates. Discrimination
could  be eliminated by discarding either the male rate or the female rate or by averaging
the two. The choice as to any one of these requires a positive  definition by the adjudicator
of the new obligation of the employer. Finally, I must note that the evidence at the hearing
disclosed  that  the  Union was  told  by the  Department  of  Labour  to  take  the  case  to
arbitration,  rather than  under  the statutory  procedures.  The  fact  that  the  government
administration believed  this to be a desirable policy,  and my discovery  in the case  of the
jurisdictional roadblocks to it, triggered my own interest in this enquiry.
16 Two of the writers  mentioned in  note  1 above have drawn a somewhat different,
though related, distinction.  Mittenthal,  at pp. 47  ff.,  says that "although  the  arbitrator's
award may  permit conduct  forbidden  by law but sanctioned  by  contract,  it should not
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require conduct  forbidden  by law  even if sanctioned by contract."  Sovern,  at pp.  38 ff.,
agrees with the  substance of this distinction, though with certain further qualifications  on
the use of statutes even in the latter case. The implications of this approach can be gathered
from  a  simple  example  of a  seniority  clause  which  conflicts  with  an  Act  to  prevent
Discrimination  in Employment because of Sex or Marital  Status. If the employer chooses
to follow the Act, and thus is in breach of the agreement, and an employee  who is entitled
under the agreement  grieves, the arbitrator will utilize the statute so as not to order  illegal
action by the employer. On the other hand, if the employer chooses to follow the agreement,
and thus is in breach of the Act, and an employee  who is entitled under the Act grieves, the
arbitrator  will  refuse  to  utilize  the statute  and  thus  will  permit illegal  action  by  the
employer,  leaving  sanctions for the latter to appropriate  governmental  action.  Since the
effect of this procedure is to leave discretion  with the immediate decision-maker  to respect
the  statute or agreement  as he chooses,  and  the employer almost  always  has this  initial
discretion,  the  adoption  of  this  approach  merely  extends  the  ambit  of  management
discretion. A compelling answer to the suggestion was made, I believe, by Meltzer, at p. 60:
Whatever one's view of the larger issue as to the role of law in arbitration, I cannot
see  an  acceptable  basis for Mr. Mittenthal's  formula.  It is  not supported  by the
authority conferred  on the arbitrator by the parties; or by the expertise imputed to
arbitrators  and courts; or by the twin desires for finality of arbitration awards  and
the limitation of judicial intervention.  Under Mr. Mittenthal's  approach,  the role
accorded to law would  depend on how an employer resolved a controversy and not
on its essential character or the functions properly delegated to different adjudicative
agencies. In my opinion, such an approach transforms an accidental consideration
into a decisive one. His formula, incidentally, also appears to run contrary to Cox's
suggestion,  on which he relies; for Cox admonished the arbitrator  to "look to  see
whether sustaining the  grievance  would require  conduct the law forbids or would
enforce an illegal contract;  if so, the arbitrator should not sustain the grievance".
In my opinion, if the arbitrator is viewed as "enforcing" contracts, he "enforces"  an
illegal  contract  equally  whether  he  causes  an  employer  to  engage  in  an  act
prohibited by statute or, by denying a remedy, condones the prohibited act already
executed by the employer.
Meltzer,  by  contrast,  forthrightly  takes  the  view  that  "where  there  is  an  irrepressible
conflict, the arbitrator, in my opinion, should respect the agreement and ignore the law....
The basis for this  approach is, of course, that the parties typically call on an arbitrator to
construe  and  not to  destroy  their  agreement".  (at p.  16).  Howlett,  on  the  other  hand,
argues  that  the statute  should  always  be  decisive,  in both  negative  and positive  terms,
because the wishes of the legislature are paramount to those of the parties.
17 See Section 34(1) of The Ontario  Labour  Relations  Act.
18 E.g.,  Vera Elkington and Wallace Barnes  (1961), 61 C.L.L.C. 928 (O.L.R.B.);  United
Brotherhood  of Carpenters  and Joiners  of America and National  Showcase Ltd. (1961),  61
C.L.L.C. 901 (O.L.R.B.); Franz  Kuntz and Pitt Street Hotel Ltd. (1963),  63 C.L.L.C.  1148
(O.L.R.B.); compare Boivin (1966)  O.L.R.B. Oct. Mthly.  Rep. 513.
19 See Weiler, The Role of the Labour Arbitrator:  Alternative  Versions  (1969),  19
University of Toronto Law Journal  16  at 29-30.
20 This is what happens in the kind of situation occurring in Bendix-Eclipse, discussed
at footnote  13  above. If the arbitrator can not only interpret the agreement but also  can
determine if this interpretation  is illegal,  and then act accordingly, he may decide  the case
finally at that stage. Of course, sometimes  the interpretation  of the statute in arbitration
will be disputed  and taken to court, but this will occur  only in some  fraction of the total
number of cases. If he ignores the statute in every case, then the party who wants it applied
will have  to  go to court every time that the other  party will  not concede its  application.
Meltzer, at p. 62,  suggested that "once the arbitrator has done the job of interpreting the
agreement, responsible parties  will presumably obey the clear mandate of the law without
recourse  to the courts."  In  fact,  I think that the party who  has claimed  his  contractual
rights successfully through arbitration and resisted the statute up to that time, is not likely
to  concede  very  often  before  judicial  review.  In  fact,  it  is  the  party  who  has  lost  in
arbitration in terms  of a pure interpretation of the agreement,  but who has a good case in
terms of the statute, who  is more  likely to concede  the case  rather than go to the trouble
and expense of trying to get the award quashed in court. Arbitral restraint in ignoring the
statute  may thus serve only to entrench the illegality  and injustice  in  the operation of  a
contract term which the legislature has defined  as against public policy.
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obligation on the parties, then any time the statute also requires interpretation
of the contract, sequential litigation in arbitration and in court will be necessary
in order to obtain final relief.21 Even in cases where the rights under the agree-
ment and under  the statute may be logically distinguishable,  they may not be
severable as a practical matter. An employee may claim that his discharge22 or
denial of -a promotion23 was unjustified and arguments  are advanced by either
side, some related to a statute and others not. One cannot anticipate how these
arguments will turn out on the facts until all of the evidence  is in and they are
evaluated,  and, in any event, they may be cumulatively intermeshed in evalu-
ating the employer decision. A more efficient solution is to  allow  all of these
factors  to  be  assessed  in arbitration, with  subsequent  review  available  else-
where24 (if this is believed necessary  by either party or by the administrative
21  A good example of this  is the R.C.A. Victor case, discussed at  footnote  2 above.
The Court there held that the statute could not be interpreted and applied  in arbitration.
However, it appears  from the Rights of Labour Act and certain  appellate  decisions,  that
the collective  agreement cannot be interpreted and applied in court (see Close v. Globe &
Mail (1967),  60 D.L.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.)). Yet the ultimate conclusion as to employee
rights  to employer contribution  to  OHSIP  appears  to  depend  on  an  interpretation  and
application of both statute and agreement. The only way to avoid a jurisdictional "no-man's
land" is to allow sequential litigation,  where an interpretation  of the earlier agreement  is
secured in arbitration and this is taken to court for interpretation  and enforcement of the
statutory change  in the agreement  is secured.  The delay,  cost, and  awkwardness  of this
procedural situation is obvious. 22In Canada-Ferro  (1971),  unreported  (Weiler),  I was  confronted  with  a case of a
woman who was discharged for excessive absenteeism. Some of this absence  was due to a
series of pregnancies with complications but some was not so' related,  and the employer's
decision was based on the total record. Section 9 of the Act to prevent Discrimination in
Employment because of Sex or Marital Status was relevant to the pregnancy-related leaves
of absence but not to the other. Hence, proceedings under the Act could deal only with one
part of the problem while a restrictive view of the arbitrator's jurisdiction would allow him
to deal only with the other part. In reality, though, the two segments of the problem could
not be distinguished.
23The problem  faced  by the  arbitrator  in  Continental Can, supra note  11,  where
seniority was denied because of sex, would be similarly complicated if other factors were
also relied on by the employer.
24The legality of the award under the statute could obviously be reviewed in court on
an application for certiorari for error of law on the face of the record. However, the Court
would have to be careful in utilizing its ordinary principles  of judicial review for this new
situation. Typically, review is sought for an error in the interpretation of the language of
the contract, and the Court will quash the award only on the grounds that the interpretation
is one that the contract language cannot reasonably  bear. This can easily be justified on the
theory that disagreements  about the merits of a contract interpretation  do not necessarily
rise to the level of an error of law, since so much of the meaning  of the contract depends
on its individual background and context. (A good example of this standard  in operation  is
Riverdale Hospital  v. Higgins, Mayo, & C.U.P.E. (1971),  71 C.L.L.C.  14,097  (Ont. C.A.).)
However, when the question is whether the arbtrator's interpretation of the statute is to be
sustained, I would submit that the test is not simply whether his conclusion  is reasonable,
but whether it is correct (in the opinion of the Court). A court should not adopt the same
attitude as it does to arbitral interpretation of contracts and hold that one meaning  of the
statute can reasonably be imputed in the context of one  collective  ageement and another
meaning be accepted  as reasonable under another collective  agreement.  A case where the
Ontario  Court of Appeal failed to appreciate  the demands  of judicial  supervision of  this
new  form of  arbitral  interpretation  is Ford Motor Co. v.  U.A.W.  (1971),  71  C.L.L.C.
14,088 (Ont.C.A.).
I should add that the department of the government responsible for administration
of the statute could also institute its own  procedures under the Act if unsatisfied  with its
treatment in arbitration.  Of course, at this second stage,  care would have to be taken to
prevent double jeopardy to the offending party or double recovery to the complainant.
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agency).  In fact,  as I learned in the context of the Sargent Hardware  case, this
is the policy of at least some governmental  administrators  of the legislation.
There are several arguments which are made to rebut this prima facie case.
The first, which is especially popular in the United States, is that arbitration is
based on consent of the parties, and the latter have not contracted to allow the
arbitrator this jurisdiction. s In Ontario, in any event, this argument appears to
me to be misconceived. Arbitration is compulsory by statute irrespective of the
wishes  of the parties. The provisions  of the  statute  are compulsory  and the
decision of the parties to evade them is illegal. It is perfectly legitimate to infer
that  the arbitrator is  himself bound by the  statute26 in  adjudicating  disputes,
again irrespective of the agreement of the parties to the contrary. No one of the
facets  of this problem depends on consent and this appears to be the weakest
argument  against an extension  of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Another important argument  against  the arbitrator's jurisdiction,  related
to but subtly different from that of consent, is concerned with the value of the
acceptability  of arbitration.27 This is one of the very important reasons for the
very existence of grievance arbitration as a mode of dispute-settlement, because
each side can select a decision-maker in whom it has confidence,  while bias is
minimized because each side has a similar "say".  However, this acceptability is
engendered in a context where the arbitrator is interpreting and applying a legal
regime created and agreed-to by the parties who bear the consequences of his
decision.  To require  arbitration  to use  an alien legal  regime, imposed  on the
parties against their wishes, may harm their confidence in the long-range value
of the process as an instrument of self-government. This is particularly the case
where  the two  parties  have negotiated  an  agreement  which  turns out  to  be
partially illegal. Although  both sides have made compromises to achieve  this
agreement,  one now utilizes  arbitration to get some parts of the bargain over-
25 This is the thrust of Meltzer's position,  and is ably supported by St. Antoine, in the
references  in  footnote  1 above.  St. Antoine  says, at p.  77,  "Arbitrators  do not, strictly
speaking, enforce contracts;  courts  enforce contracts.  The arbitrator is simply the 'official
reader' designated by the parties to provide definitive interpretations of their agreement....
An arbitrator is the creature of the contract. It is the source and limit of his authority, and
he has no licence to look beyond its borders for some external standard by which to nullify
or restrict its operation."  Mittenthal  seconds  this,  at p.  58:  "Statutory law may  guide the
arbitrator  on occasion.  But the arbitrator must follow the rule of law established by the
contract.  He is part of a private process for the adjudication  of private rights  and duties.
He  should  not be  asked to assume  public  responsibilities  and to  do  the work  of public
agencies. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which transcends
the parties."  Even in the United States,  Sovern takes what I believe to be a more realistic
approach  which holds  that it is the demands  of the national  labour  law policy, not  the
agreement of the parties, which must be decisive with respect to this issue. He says that the
"critical  question is whether it is a desirable method of coordinating  a private system of
adjudication  with  a  governmentally-imposed  legal and  administrative  framework."
26 The provisions  of the Act prohibiting discrimination  on  account  of sex  prohibit
"persons"  establishing or  maintaining employment  classifications  or  lines  of progression
which differentiate  by sex. Can it not be said that an arbitrator is a person who maintains
such an  illegal classification  when he  applies  and  enforces  it in adjudicating  a claim  in
arbitration?
271 have developed  in more detail the significance of this  characteristic of arbitration
in  Weiler,  Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change (Ottawa:  Queen's  Printer,  1970)
67-68.
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turned in his favour. 28 Unfortunately, there is another dimension to the problem
caused by this issue for the confidence  of the parties in arbitration. It may be
that a lawyer can appreciate the subtle reasons why an arbitrator should ignore
the clear demands of a statutory requirement but, in my experience, the layman
on either the employer or the union side cannot and does not. It is  at least as
likely that the acceptability  of arbitration will be eroded in this direction as in
the other.
It seems that the most compelling concern is that of arbitral competence. 29
Arbitrators are specialists in, and eventually become expert at, interpreting and
administering the language  of collective  agreements.  This is  not true of  their
capacities with respect to the language of statutes and the same may well be the
case with  the  counsel  who  must  provide  arguments  for  their  decision.  On
balance, though, I  do not believe this is a valid argument for total exclusion
of statutes from arbitration. In the first place, it is inconsistent with the require-
ment  and the fact that law is  constantly  being used in interpretation  within
arbitration. It is common to see reference in opinions  to contract law, labour
law, criminal law, or evidence law, involving both statutes and cases. Similarly,
as I stated earlier, the "mandatory" provisions in question here should be used
in interpreting vague contract language. If arbitrators are competent to interpret
statutes  to  elaborate  the  agreement,  they  should  be  equally  competent  to
interpret statutes to over-ride the agreement.30 Secondly,  I do not believe that
construction  of  statutes  is  so  very  different  from  construction  of  collective
agreements, or that arbitrators  are less competent than alternative adjudicators
to utilize statutory materials. The kinds of people who  do arbitrate in Ontario
are  almost all  lawyers,  whether judges,  prosecutors,  labour  board  members,
labour law teachers, etc., and they are not strangers to this kind of legislation.
Thirdly, this argument for exclusion of these materials is strangely self-fulfilling.
281 would note the trend in recent legislation in Ontario to utilize the existing labour
arbitration  process to impose solutions to labour relations problems  on parties  who have
not agreed to them. Examples include interest-dispute  arbitration in hospitals, police,  etc.,
and  arbitration  of  damage  claims  for  illegal  strikes  and  lockouts  outside  a  collective
agreement.  (See Section 68a  of Labour Relations Act.)
29 This argument is particularly  relied on by Meltzer in his comments  in both panel
discussions  referred to in footnote  1 in which  he participated.  He gives  an example  of a
case  where  an  arbitrator may  well  have erred  in interpreting  a  statute  and  holding  it
invalidated an agreement and suggests that this possibility is a good reason for arbitrators
not exercising  any jurisdiction at all to apply statutory law in conflict with the agreement.
30This  point is  made  by Sovern,  in the  article  cited  in  note  1 above,  at  34.  His
article goes on to deal with the relevance  of this problem of the sophisticated  doctrines  in
American law of "primary jurisdiction." The common sense which underlies these doctrines
is  based  on  the  assumption  that the  legislature  must  have  had  very  good  reasons  for
centralizing enforcement  of a new statute within the confines  of a specialized  and expert
administrative  agency. To the extent that unsupervised and ad hoc arbitration  boards take
on themselves  the  task of interpreting  the statute, a  very  incoherent and often  distorted
administration  of the law is likely to develop.  However,  there are  two reasons  why these
dangers are simply not applicable in Canada. In the first place, judicial review of the inter-
pretation of the legislation by arbitrators results in centralized supervision in the appellate
courts  (see note 24  above).  Secondly, the statutes we are talking about almost invariably
create a system of decentralized adjudication at the primary level. The devices adopted are
ad hoc boards of inquiry (often composed of the same people who act as arbitrators) and/or
enforcement  procedures before  a provincial  court judge. Whatever  controls  there  are to
this system  of adjudication  come  from the  same  appellate  courts  who  are  available  to
review arbitral interpretations  of this same statute.
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If arbitrators do not advert to, and consider statutes consistently, then they will
not likely be expert.  However, if they can and do use this source of law, they
will become experienced in the task.
The argument of incompetence,  to the extent that it is valid, is really one
of caution. In cases of doubt, the decision should be in favour of legality of the
contract, but if illegality  appears clear, arbitrators should not be afraid to rely
on their judgment. It is  true that arbitrators  may err in interpreting statutory
law but then judicial review is available for correcting those errors,  which will
likely occur in only a small minority of cases. Moreover,  arbitrators  as a body
do  have  something  to  add  to the  legal  system  in  analysing the  way  statutes
should  impinge  on  the  collective  bargaining  process.  Only  if they  actively
exercise  this jurisdiction  will  the  benefits  of their views  be  available  to the
reviewing courts who must make the final judgments. The alternative, of course,
is to require all,  or almost all, cases to be relitigated in terms  of the statutory
issue, and this time in front of a court which does not have the assistance  of an
independent  examination  of  this problem in the forum  where the  rest of the
matter has already been adjudicated.
We are left then with a conflict between two competing values, institutional
competence  and institutional economy. For reasons  given earlier, I believe the
former is of lesser weight in more situations than the latter, and I would support
a jurisdiction  in  arbitration  to  apply  statutory  rules  even  where  they  are  in
conflict with contract terms. I would have to be a poor practical lawyer, though,
if I were to predict that our higher  courts  will reach this same conclusion,  at
least in the near  immediate  future.  My main  concern,  or  at least hope, with
respect  to  the  courts  is  that  they  not  deprive  the  arbitrators  of  statutory
materials as an aid in interpretation,  at the same time as they deny us the right
to  follow  the law  of the  statute when  it contradicts  the  law of the  contract.
A more adequate answer to the situation will have to come from the legislature
and  the statutory  draftsmen  who  have created  the  problem  and must accept
responsibility  for solving  it. Moreover,  unlike  the  courts,  the legislature  can
make the decision for every statute as it assesses the weight of the two competing
values in the individual case, rather than as a matter of general principle. 31
My  final  comments  in  this  paper, then,  are  directed  to  the  legislative
draftsman. I suggest that there are three separate  issues for the law-maker in
this area which, unfortunately, do not seem to have been fully sorted out. There
is, first of all, the question whether  a statute should be made to over-ride  the
31 The real  problem in  this  area  has been  the  almost total  failure  of our  statutory
draftsmen  to address  this problem,  one way or the other. Only  in Section  10(3)  of The
Health Services Insurance  Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 200, is there explicit provision for arbitration
of statutory amendments of collective  agreements, and this may have served only to make
more conspicuous the omission in Section  10(2). It is quite customary in The Employment
Standards  Act, R.S.O.  1970 c.  147,  and other such legislation to make the Act applicable
notwithstanding  agreement  to  the contrary  (see  Section  3 of the Act),  and to leave  the
matter at that. My  private conversations  with some officials  responsible for administering
this  legislation indicate  that they believe  that such a mandatory provision  itself provides
the  base  for  the arbitrator's  jurisdiction  and,  indeed,  these  officials  then  encourage  the
channelling of the disputes under the Act to the grievance procedure and arbitration if it is
available. The discussion in this paper and seminar should serve at least to dispel the illusion
that the problem is that simple.
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terms of a collective agreement, as opposed to an ordinary contract of employ-
ment.  Where  the  purpose  of  the  statute  is  to  protect  the  interests  of the
employees generally,  the legislature should not lightly conclude that collective
bargaining is not a preferable  vehicle for  this purpose, without the  distorting
impact of a generalized statutory rule. For example, I can think of good reasons
why  the  Employment  Standards  Act  and  women's  rights  legislation  might
be distinguished in this regard. However,  assuming that the legislature wants
the statute to be applied irrespective of a collective agreement, the next decision
it must make is whether it wants the individual employee to have the immediate
remedy of the  new rights  created by the  statute,  even  though his  union has
agreed to trade them away in negotiations. The alternative is to use the statute
as  a weapon by which the government  agency may force  the parties  who  are
mutually responsible  for the  illegal  agreement to agree,  mutually,  to  alter it
with  concessions  from  either  side.  Again,  though,  assuming  the  legislature
wants immediate, restrospective  remedies for the individual, the next question
is whether the procedure or forum for obtaining this remedy,  and accommo-
dating the  agreement  and the statute,  should be arbitration,  or  a court,  or a
specialized  tribunal.  For the reasons I have given,  I believe  that arbitration
should be  available  as a primary  source  of  relief, with  subsequent  review  in
court for errors of law,  and with  administrative  remedies  available under the
statute  as  an  alternative.  Section  37  of the Labour Relations  Act should be
amended to provide that where a statute is intended (1)  to over-ride a collective
agreement  and  (2)  to afford immediate  employment  rights  to the  employee,
the ordinary grievance  arbitration procedures  under the collective  agreement
should be an avenue for obtaining this relief.
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